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I. INTRODUCTION 
The process of establishing a stable and effective system of taxation is a hallmark 
of nearly all modern states.  Indeed, securing the ability to tax is a sine qua non of the 
historical process of state-building.1  From ancient Athens to the modern United States, 
nearly all societies have been concerned with the process of successfully collecting tax 
revenues.2  One critical concern that all taxing authorities face is limiting the “tax gap”—
the difference between what should be paid voluntarily and on time and the amount that 
is actually paid.3 
Among the many modern administrative innovations adopted to facilitate 
effective tax compliance, arguably none has been more significant than the use of third-
party reporting and tax withholding.  Since at least the early nineteenth century, when 
Great Britain first adopted a crude form of withholding as part of its national income tax,4 
governments have increasingly relied on harnessing the knowledge and power of third 
parties to increase income tax compliance.  As a result, employers, financial institutions, 
and business corporations have become instrumental remittance vehicles and reporting 
agents for nearly all modern taxing agencies. 
In most developed nation-states today, some form of withholding has become a 
socially accepted part of the tax system.  Although tax protests of one sort or another 
have been an endemic part of U.S. history,5 today most ordinary Americans seem to 
accept our current system of income tax collections.  National lawmakers, for their part, 
have gone further in praising the present day system.  One described withholding as “the 
cornerstone of the administration of our individual income tax.”6  Tax scholars, likewise, 
have documented how vital withholding and information reporting have been to 
generating tax revenue.7 
Yet, like most administrative achievements, the effective implementation of 
information reporting and tax withholding did not occur quickly or easily.  When the 
United States originally adopted withholding as part of the Civil War income tax—the 
nation’s first federal income tax—this novel process of tax collection was highly 
contested and contingent.  Not only was there tremendous political and social opposition, 
legal challenges to the process reached the U.S. Supreme Court.  In a significant—yet 
                                                      
1 Phillip T. Hoffman, What Do States Do? Politics and Economic History, 75 J. ECON. HIST. 303 
(2015).  For an introduction to the vast literature on taxation and state-building, see generally John L. 
Campbell, The State and Fiscal Sociology, ANN. REV. SOC., 1993, at 163–85. 
2 CAROLYN WEBBER & AARON B. WILDAVSKY, A HISTORY OF TAXATION AND EXPENDITURE IN THE 
WESTERN WORLD 107 (1986). 
3 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-968, Tax Gap: IRS Can Improve Efforts to 
Address Tax Evasion by Networks of Businesses and Related Entities 7 (2010). 
4 An Exposition of the Act for a Contribution on Property, Professions, Trades, and Offices; In 
Which the Principles and Provisions of the Act Are Fully Considered, with a View to Facilitate Its Execution, 
Both with Respect to Persons Chargeable, and Persons Liable to the Tax by Way of Deduction, and the 
Officers Chosen to Carry it into Effect (London, I. Gold 1803); see also PIROSKA SOOS, THE ORIGINS OF 
TAXATION AT SOURCE IN ENGLAND (1997). 
5 See generally ROMAIN D. HURET, AMERICAN TAX RESISTERS (2014). 
6 Tax Compliance Act of 1982 and Related Legislation: Hearing on H.R. 6300 Before the H. 
Comm. on Ways & Means, 97th Cong. 162 (1982) [hereinafter Hearing]. 
7 See, e.g., Leandra Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps: The Role That Third Parties Play in Tax 
Compliance, 60 STAN. L. REV. 695 (2007); Joel Slemrod, Does it Matter Who Writes the Check to the 
Government? The Economics of Tax Remittance, 61 NAT’L TAX J. 251 (2008); Piroska Soos, Self-Employed 
Evasion and Tax Withholding: A Comparative Study and Analysis of the Issues, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 107, 
121 (1990). 
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understudied—legal decision, the Court upheld the constitutionality of withholding. 8  
Still, social resistance to the policy persisted.9  The issue became moot when the Civil 
War income tax was eventually repealed after the war, but opposition to the growing 
administrative powers of tax collection remained.10 
In subsequent decades, tensions over the use of information reporting and tax 
withholding waxed and waned in parallel with the development of the modern U.S. 
income tax.  In 1913, when the federal income tax became a permanent part of the U.S. 
tax system—on the heels of the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment—Congress 
initially enacted a crude form of tax withholding and information reporting.11  It was soon 
eliminated, however, due to vociferous opposition from business interests and limited 
federal administrative capacity.12  Between the two world wars, when tax rates remained 
relatively low and the income tax affected mainly the wealthy elite, ersatz types of third-
party reporting aroused little opposition.13  It was not until the Current Tax Payment Act 
of 1943 helped institutionalize a mass income tax and the process of withholding that 
strong objections once again rose to the fore.14 
Although today some individuals and businesses may object to tax withholding 
and third-party reporting, these administrative methods have generally become a socially 
accepted and politically entrenched part of our tax system.15  Not only have lawmakers 
celebrated withholding as an administrative “cornerstone,” 16  but most everyday 
Americans appear to believe that employers, financial institutions, and business 
corporations should be able to collect and remit tax dollars and convey important tax 
information to the government.  Thus, while tax withholding and information reporting 
have had a contested and contingent past, they both appear to be stable and accepted parts 
of the present-day U.S. tax system.17 
The evolution of withholding and third-party reporting raises a series of 
important historical questions: how did a contested administrative concept become an 
accepted and celebrated method of tax collection?  What were the pivotal periods of 
administrative reform during this seemingly path-dependent process?  Why were 
activists, commentators, and lawmakers opposed to the growth of this administrative 
                                                      
8 United States v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 84 U.S. 322 (1872). 
9 See Sheldon D. Pollack, The First National Income Tax, 67 TAX LAW., Winter 2014, at 16. 
10 AJAY K. MEHROTRA, MAKING THE MODERN AMERICAN FISCAL STATE: LAW, POLITICS, AND THE 
RISE OF PROGRESSIVE TAXATION 1877-1929 (2013); ROBERT STANLEY, LAW AND THE DIMENSIONS OF ORDER: 
ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX (1991). 
11 Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114, 169 (1913). 
12 War Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, § 1204(2), 40 Stat. 300, 332 (1917); see Roy G. Blakey, The 
New Revenue Act, 6 AM. ECON REV. 837, 842 (1916) (“Perhaps no feature of the income tax has caused more 
unfavorable criticism than the stoppage-at-the-source provision, which throws much of the burden of 
collecting the government’s revenues upon banks, trust companies, corporations, and other agents.”). 
13 Anuj C. Desai, What a History of Withholding Tells Us About The Relationship Between Statutes 
and Constitutional Law, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 859, 896–99 (2014). 
14 Id. at 899-900; Current Tax Payment Act of 1943, Pub. L. 68, Ch. 120, 57 Stat. 126 (June 9, 
1943). 
15 See, e.g., Desai, supra note 13.  But see Richard L. Doernberg, The Case Against Withholding, 
61 TEX. L. REV. 595 (1982) (scholar acknowledges that withholding has become entrenched, but argues that 
it should be replaced). 
16 Hearing, supra note 6. 
17 As tax expert Bruce Bartlett has noted, “it is highly unlikely that withholding will ever be 
abolished.”  Bruce Bartlett, Tax Withholding Still Controversial After 70 Years, N.Y. TIMES ECONOMIX BLOG, 
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/10/22/tax-withholding-still-controversial-after-70-years/?_r=0 
[https://perma.cc/WB52-93SN]. 
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practice?  And, how did reformers and government officials overcome this hostility 
during critical junctures in the development of this important administrative 
achievement?  These questions frame the historical analysis in this article. 
These questions are not merely about narrow, academic interests.  Examining the 
early history of U.S. income tax withholding and third-party reporting may provide some 
traction on broader questions about the social, political, and economic conditions that are 
necessary for effective administrative tax reform.  If one of the central aims of this law 
review symposium on “Reforming the IRS” is to imagine what tax administrative reform 
might look like, it may be instructive to look back and understand empirically how the 
United States was able to adopt and maintain one of its most successful administrative 
reforms—the adoption and permanent establishment of income tax reporting and 
withholding. 
One of the principal aims of this article is to attend to the early U.S. history of 
income tax withholding and third-party information reporting.  Building upon earlier 
studies, this article contends that examining the pre-1943 adoption of income tax 
withholding is critical not only to a deeper historical understanding of how information 
reporting and withholding were transformed from a contested concept to an 
administrative cornerstone, but also to our future expectations of administrative and 
bureaucratic reform. 
More specifically, this article contends that significant administrative reform has 
occurred historically through a process of incremental institutional change and what 
political scientist Hugh Heclo calls “social learning.” 18   Rarely in American 
administrative history do we see a dramatic or radical alteration of bureaucratic processes 
or procedures.  Instead, what the history of information reporting and withholding 
illustrates is that reformers and policymakers developed key administrative advancements 
gradually by puzzling over policy options based on past ideas and experiences as well as 
new information.19 
Although wars and national emergencies have often been triggers for dramatic 
changes to governance and administration, these events have also brought with them 
great uncertainty and complex problems and puzzles. 20   Faced with such grave 
uncertainty, policy analysts and lawmakers have turned to past practices and ideas to 
solve pressing problems.  They have engaged in social learning.  Leading tax experts and 
government officials have relied on the legacy of past policies and the previous social and 
political responses to pressing problems to understand how best to build an effective tax 
collection system. 
This historical story unfolds in five acts.  The first briefly summarizes the 
existing literature on tax withholding.  In the process, it explains why a pre-1943 history 
of withholding is particularly pertinent.  Each of the article’s subsequent four parts 
investigates one of the critical junctures in the early development of modern 
administrative practices.  Part III examines the beginnings of the ephemeral system of 
                                                      
18 HUGH HECLO, MODERN SOCIAL POLITICS IN BRITAIN AND SWEDEN (1974); see also Peter A. Hall, 
Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State: The Case of Economic Policymaking in Britain, 25 COMP. 
POL. 275 (1993). 
19 Hall, supra note 18.  Peter Hall defines “social learning” more precisely as “a deliberative 
attempt to adjust the goals or techniques of policy in response to past experience and new information.  
Learning is indicated when policy changes as the result of such a process.”  Id. at 278. 
20 See generally W. ELLIOT BROWNLEE, FEDERAL TAXATION IN AMERICA: A SHORT HISTORY (2004). 
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income tax withholding during the U.S. Civil War.  It explains how Congress, the courts, 
and the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR)—the forerunner to the Internal Revenue 
Service—all helped to initiate the process of “social learning” that would come to inform 
subsequent generations of administrators and reformers. 
Part IV turns to the 1913 income tax and shows how the Civil War legacy shaped 
the adoption of the first system of withholding and information reporting.  During this 
critical period, reformers and state-builders were able to elaborate upon the early success 
of the Civil War income tax and the Supreme Court’s previous support for withholding to 
quell opposition to the new “stoppage at the source” system.  Not only did the concept of 
using third parties as quasi-treasury officials have the formal support of the courts, but 
the material achievements of this process taught subsequent policymakers an important 
lesson about successful administrative innovation. 
Part V explores the interregnum between the use of information reporting as part 
of the 1913 income tax and the institutional establishment of mandatory withholding in 
1943.  This period is critical for what it can tell us about the rising opposition to income 
tax withholding.  This period was also when the advent of Social Security in 1935 
contributed to a learning process that eventually paved the way for our permanent system 
of income tax withholding.  Thus, between the two World Wars, the administrative 
process of withholding went through an episodic era when its future fortunes were highly 
uncertain.  This section seeks to make sense of the rise, fall, and return of income tax 
withholding and information reporting. 
This article concludes with an assessment of how, during the post-WWII era, 
withholding and information reporting became an entrenched part not only of our tax 
system, but also of American political and legal culture.  The conclusion also reflects on 
how the historical evolution of withholding and information reporting may help us better 
understand the current and future possibilities for administrative reforms. 
II. THE EXISTING LITERATURE AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE EARLY 
HISTORY OF WITHHOLDING 
Other scholars have duly noted the importance of third-party reporting and 
income tax withholding.  Public finance economists, for example, have empirically 
documented how more stringent forms of withholding and information reporting 
generally increase tax compliance.21  Tax law scholars have similarly documented how 
third-party reporting provides a structural mechanism to reduce tax evasion and facilitate 
compliance.22  Some scholars have even theorized that the American combination of 
inexact withholding and tax filing reconciliation may have ancillary political and social 
benefits beyond increasing compliance.23  Nearly all of these accounts are premised on 
the notion that the U.S. tax system operates under what political scientist Margaret Levi 
has dubbed “quasi-voluntary compliance,” a system of compliance that combines 
individual voluntariness with potential compulsion by the state.24 
                                                      
21 See, e.g., Ann D. Witte & Diane F. Woodbury, The Effect of Tax Laws and Tax Administration 
on Tax Compliance: The Case of the U.S. Individual Income Tax, 38 NAT’L TAX J. 1 (1985); Slemrod, supra 
note 7. 
22 Lederman, supra note 7. 
23 LAWRENCE ZELENAK, LEARNING TO LOVE FORM 1040 (2013).  Zelenak contends that the present 
U.S. system of inexact withholding and tax filing reconciliation has the potential to increase a sense of civic 
engagement and fiscal citizenship.  Id. at 111–125. 
24 See generally MARGARET LEVI, OF RULE AND REVENUE (1997). 
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Indeed, withholding and third-party reporting are both crucial catalysts in 
supporting a quasi-voluntary system of tax compliance.  As most students of U.S. 
taxation know, the use of withholding and third-party reporting curtail, and in some cases 
almost eliminate, the underreporting of taxable individual income.  According to IRS tax 
gap studies, only one percent of wages and salaries, which are remitted through 
withholding, are underreported.  Similarly, only four percent of taxable interest and 
dividends, which are governed by third-party information reporting requirements, are 
misreported.25  Moreover, tax withholding and third-party reporting are responsible for a 
significant portion of annual public revenues.  Scholarly estimates suggest that 
withholding alone accounts for roughly 70% of all annual tax income tax receipts.26  
These figures and the existing literature illustrate the critical role that withholding and 
information reporting play in our existing tax system. 
 
Table 1: Compliance Estimates for Selected Types of Personal Income, 200127 
Type of personal income Reported net income as a 
percentage of true net 
income from this source 
Percentage of total 
individual income tax 
underreporting contributed 
by this item 
Wages and salaries 99 5 
Pensions and annuities 96 2 
Interest and dividends 96 2 
Capital gains 88 6 
Partnerships and S 
corporations 
82 11 
Nonfarm proprietor income 43 35 
Farm net income 28 3 
 
Despite the acknowledged importance of information reporting and withholding, 
few scholars have examined the historical origins and development of these concepts.  
Those that have generally use the adoption of mandatory withholding in 1943 as a case 
study to test empirically some larger socio-legal or political theory.  For example, 
Professor Anuj C. Desai has recently explored whether the Current Tax Payment Act of 
1943 and the establishment of withholding can be depicted as a “superstatute” within 
existing legal and constitutional theories. 28   Likewise, economic historian Charlotte 
Twight has investigated the evolution of federal income tax withholding to study how 
public choice theory, or what Twight refers to as a “transaction-cost” framework, can 
                                                      
25 See infra Table 1.  INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., Tax Gap Update, Individual Income Tax 
Underreporting Gap Estimates, Tax Year 2001 (2007), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/tax_gap_update 
_070212.pdf [https://perma.cc/X57N-LP65]. 
26 Robert Higgs, Wartime Origins of Modern Income-Tax Withholding, INDEPENDENT INSTITUTE 
(Dec. 24, 2007), http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=2092 [https://perma.cc/973P-GT4X]. 
27 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 25. 
28 Desai, supra note 13 (determining that the Current Tax Payment Act of 1943 is in some ways a 
“superstatute,” but not in the way that the term is conventionally defined).  For more on the conventional 
definition of a “superstatute,” see generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF 
STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2010). 
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explain institutional and ideological change. 29   Although these types of empirically-
grounded, historical analyses are insightful, their theory-driven investigations frequently 
occlude or overlook the nuances of historical context and sequence. 
Even those historians and historically-minded social scientists who have attended 
to the importance of historical conditions and chronology have generally overlooked the 
pre-history of withholding and information reporting. 30   They have typically been 
preoccupied with the World War II period, when a unique political compromise, known 
as the Ruml Plan, was brokered to ensure the permanent adoption of income tax 
withholding for most individual taxpayers.  In fact, nearly all fiscal historians of the 
United States tend to agree that the major pivot points in the development of the modern 
American income tax regime and its attendant administrative procedures occurred during 
the mid-1940s and afterwards.31   Yet, like the theory-driven case studies, these rich 
historical narratives often elide the significance of the long duration of institutional and 
administrative reforms.  They overlook how state actors gradually learned from pre-1943 
practices to improve administrative techniques that helped maximize tax collection well 
beyond the 1940s.32 
Without taking the developments of the1940s for granted, this article focuses 
mainly on the pre-history of U.S. tax withholding and third-party reporting.  It contends 
that from the Civil War era through the 1930s, American policymakers looked to the past 
and to the experiences of other countries to determine how best to facilitate tax 
compliance.  Through this process of learning from the successes and failures of past 
policies and the social and political responses to them, American tax administrators were 
able to transform a contested concept into a cornerstone of administrative practice. 
III. THE CIVIL WAR INCOME TAX AND THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN 
WITHHOLDING 
The American experience with income tax withholding began with the Civil War 
income taxes.  At first, Northern lawmakers attempted to pay for the unprecedented costs 
of the war by simply raising rates on the existing tax regime, namely the protective tariff 
and excise taxes on alcohol and tobacco.33  But they soon realized that while the tariff 
may have been a useful tool of international trade policy, it was rather ineffective in 
raising large amounts of revenue in a short period of time.  Likewise, hiking excise taxes 
during a national crisis, when consumption of luxury goods was declining, proved 
equally futile.34 
                                                      
29 Charlotte Twight, Evolution of Federal Income Tax Withholding: The Machinery of Institutional 
Change, 14 CATO J. 359 (1995); see also CHARLOTTE TWIGHT, DEPENDENT ON D.C.: THE RISE OF FEDERAL 
CONTROL OVER THE LIVES OF ORDINARY AMERICANS (2003). 
30 See, e.g., BROWNLEE, supra note 20; SIDNEY RATNER, TAXATION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 
(1980); JOSEPH J. THORNDIKE, THEIR FAIR SHARE: TAXING THE RICH IN THE AGE OF FDR (2012). 
31 See BROWNLEE, supra note 20; RATNER, supra note 30; THORNDIKE, supra note 30; Carolyn C. 
Jones, Class Tax to Mass Tax: The Role of Propaganda in the Expansion of the Income Tax During World 
War II, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 685 (1989). 
32 One scholar has stated that “[w]ithholding did not play a major role in the collection and 
enforcement of the income tax in the United States until 1943, when Congress introduced withholding on 
wages and salaries.”  Soos, supra note 7, at 124.  Such an interpretation, of course, overlooks the gradual 
process of social learning, whereby lawmakers became educated by government officials about the successes 
and failures of past tax administrative practices. 
33 STEVEN A. BANK ET AL., WAR AND TAXES (2008). 
34 SHELDON D. POLLACK, WAR, REVENUE AND STATE BUILDING: FINANCING THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
THE AMERICAN STATE 217–19 (2009). 
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As lawmakers began looking for alternative sources of revenue, some suggested 
a national property tax.  U.S. Treasury Secretary Salmon Chase explored the idea of 
adopting an emergency national property tax based on a levy adopted during the War of 
1812.  Yet given the constitutional requirements of apportionment for a federal direct tax 
on property, this idea was quickly dashed.35  Nevertheless, Chase’s reference to past 
practices not only illustrates the Treasury Department’s early instinct to turn to historical 
precedents to learn from the past, it also shows a contingent path not taken.  If the Union 
had attempted a property tax, the future fate of the income tax and the system of 
withholding and third-party reporting may have been dramatically different.  
The failure of existing taxes to meet the increasing fiscal demands of the war 
forced the Union to turn to bold, new sources of public revenue, including an innovative 
income tax.  Levied on both individual and business income, the new tax quickly became 
an important source of wartime revenue.  The first effective federal income tax was 
adopted in 1862, when Congress imposed a “normal” three percent tax on “annual gains, 
profits, or incomes” above eight hundred dollars, “whether derived from any kinds of 
property, rents, interests, dividends, salaries or from any profession, trade, employment 
or vocation carried on in the United States or elsewhere, or from any source whatever.”36  
In 1864, as the war dragged on and the demand for public revenue continued to increase, 
Congress raised income tax rates and lowered certain exemption levels, leading to even 
greater tax revenue.  By the following year, approximately 10% of Union households 
were paying an income tax, and the levy was generating roughly $61 million or about one 
fifth of total annual federal revenue.37  In sum, the first American experiment with an 
income tax became a vital part of Civil War financing.38 
One of the primary reasons for the relative success of the Civil War income tax 
was the use of withholding.  In 1865 alone, the federal government collected nearly 40% 
of income tax receipts through the crude and nascent process of income tax 
withholding.39  The specific withholding provisions began with the 1862 law and required 
certain institutions to withhold the “normal” tax rate of 3% on the payment of dividends 
and interest to stockholders and bondholders, respectively. 40   At the same time, the 
federal government was required to withhold the “normal” rate on salary income.  When 
Congress increased the “normal” rate to 5% in 1864, it also increased the withholding 
rate to 5% and broadened the number of institutions required to withhold income taxes on 
interest and dividends to include other transportation companies besides railroads.41 
Throughout its evolution, the Civil War income tax benefited from a process of 
social learning.  Key tax experts working in the Treasury Department and the Bureau of 
Internal Revenue collectively puzzled over the problem of tax collection.  Despite strong 
resistance from business interests and the wealthy elite who were the targets of the 
income tax, administrative reformers forged the bureaucratic autonomy necessary to 
                                                      
35 Tax History Project: The Civil War, TAX ANALYSTS, http://www.taxhistory.org/www/website.nsf 
/web/THM1861?OpenDocument [https://perma.cc/34VW-WL5P]. 
36 Revenue Act of 1862, ch. 119, § 90, 12 Stat. 432, 473 (1862). 
37 See BANK ET AL., supra note 33; BROWNLEE, supra note 20; HUGH ROCKOFF, UNTIL IT’S OVER, 
OVER THERE: THE U.S. ECONOMY IN WORLD WAR I, in THE ECONOMICS OF WORLD WAR I 310, 316 (Stephen 
Broadberry & Mark Harrison eds., 2005). 
38 BANK ET AL., supra note 33. 
39 Frederick C. Howe, The Federal Revenues and the Income Tax, 4 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & 
SOC. SCI. 557, 568 (1894). 
40 12 Stat. at 469. 
41 Revenue Act of 1864, ch. 173, §§ 120, 122, 123, 13 Stat. 223, 283-85 (1864). 
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overcome such defiance.  They looked abroad to the British experience with “taxation at 
the source” to construct their own crude yet effective form of income tax withholding. 
A. Learning from the British 
The United Kingdom first adopted its own form of income tax withholding in 
1803.  Known at the time as “taxation at source,” this early form of withholding was seen 
as a “peculiar distinction” of the British income tax that was designed mainly as a 
bulwark against tax evasion.42  Levied during the Napoleonic Wars, the income tax and 
the use of withholding were critical components of wartime fiscal policies.  Some 
historians have maintained that British Prime Minister Henry Addington introduced 
“taxation at source” in 1803 because of his wide knowledge of English fiscal history and 
the use of withholding for other direct taxes, many of which had been in operation since 
the sixteenth century.  Addington, it is frequently maintained, deployed his own form of 
incremental social learning.43 
Regardless of the precise origins of British withholding, there is little doubt that 
the mechanism proved to be highly durable.  The U.K. experience with taxation at the 
source endured throughout the Napoleonic wars and beyond.  While the 1803 income tax 
was amended several times, taxation at the source remained an integral part of the tax 
laws throughout the war and well beyond.  Ultimately, when the British income tax was 
reinstated on a permanent basis in 1842, taxation at the source returned as a core 
element.44 
One reason for the early success of British withholding was because a flat 
income tax rate, as opposed to a graduated one, allowed taxation at source to operate 
easily and efficiently.45  With a flat rate, remittance agents did not need to speculate about 
the taxpayer’s total tax liability.  They could easily withhold and remit the “normal” rate 
due on taxable income.  U.S. policymakers picked up on this subtle, yet effective, 
observation.  This was one reason why Congress matched the normal rate of tax with the 
withholding rate during the Civil War.  When the normal rate was increased during the 
war, so too was the rate for withholding.46   
British policy makers praised the administrative significance of withholding, just 
as their American counterparts would do much later.  The U.K. Royal Commission on the 
Income Tax hailed taxation at source as of “paramount importance” and as “the only sure 
safeguard against evasion of duty.”47  Likewise, U.K. Inland Revenue has celebrated 
taxation at source as “a principle which has been of incalculable benefit to the Revenue 
of this country, and which . . . remains the great buttress of Income Tax stability and 
efficiency.”48  Early twentieth-century American tax experts, looking back at the British 
                                                      
42 ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE INCOME TAX: FIRST INSTALMENT OF THE MINUTES OF EVIDENCE WITH 
APPENDICES, Cmd. 288-1, para. 19 (1919) (hereinafter MINUTES OF EVIDENCE) (testimony of a Commissioner 
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experience, also acknowledged that this early form of withholding was “perhaps the chief 
cause of the great success of the English income tax.”49 
During the Civil War, American tax officials were well aware of Britain’s 
income tax and its peculiar distinction.  Indeed, Union policymakers frequently looked 
overseas to the British experience to learn how to enact and administer a new income tax 
despite growing resistance.50  Treasury Secretary Salmon P. Chase may not have been 
well-versed in economic policy and European precedents, but the first Commissioner of 
the Bureau of Internal Revenue, George S. Boutwell, was keenly aware of British fiscal 
policies.51  Although Boutwell was only BIR commissioner for a short period before he 
was elected to Congress, his deep knowledge of British history and politics informed his 
short yet pivotal duration at the BIR.52 
Even before the Treasury Department began looking abroad for assistance, 
Congressional leaders were explicitly pointing to the British income tax as a model worth 
replicating.  North Carolina Senator F.H. Simmons, a key proponent of the income tax, 
understood that there were other industrialized nations in the world that had successfully 
administered such a levy.  “I think it is a pretty safe rule to follow the practice of older 
nations who have had this tax for fifty years,” he announced to his fellow lawmakers.  
“They have tried this; and I noticed in the last revision of the income tax of England, that 
they have kept the feature of taxing Government securities one half,”53 as a proxy for 
withholding. 
American tax experts, reflecting back on the efficacy of the Civil War income 
tax, echoed what the British had learned about the importance of withholding.  They 
stressed how withholding eased administrative burdens and limited the possibility of 
evasion.  “A large portion of the tax was paid,” wrote tax reformer Fredric C. Howe, 
“without the income passing through the hands of the eventual payor of the duty while 
fraudulent returns were rendered impossible and the necessity of supervision was reduced 
to a minimum.”54  Others acknowledged the pivotal role that business corporations and 
financial institutions played in remitting income taxes.  “[I]t was much easier and simpler 
to collect [tax] from the corporations than from the individual stockholders and 
bondholders,” noted political economist Joseph Hill.55 
The British experience with the income tax also presaged some of the objections 
that Americans would level against the new levy and its system of collection.  English 
citizens protested that an income tax was unfair because it taxed all income equally, 
regardless of its source.  Other critics maintained that the new levy would blunt economic 
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incentives and therefore lead to lower future tax revenue.  And perhaps most importantly, 
many complained that an income tax was inherently intrusive and “inquisitorial.”  As one 
commentator at the time explained, the income tax “proposes to establish an inquisitorial 
power unknown in this country—inconsistent with the principles of the British 
Constitution—and repugnant to the feelings of Englishmen.”56  The loss of privacy that 
would come with greater tax assessment also troubled many British taxpayers.  “Is a true 
Briton to have no privacy?” asked one opponent.  “Are the fruits of his labour and toil to 
be picked over, farthing by farthing, by the pimply minions of Bureaucracy?”57 
Americans echoed these complaints.  As the Civil War income tax was winding 
its way through Congress, lawmakers stressed how the collection of a direct tax on 
income would require a vast bureaucracy of tax collectors.  New York Congressman 
Roscoe Conkling argued that “one of the most obnoxious—perhaps the most 
obnoxious—of all it features is that which creates an army of officers whose business it is 
to collect the tax.”58  The new law would create “an army of office-holders,” Conkling 
continued.  “It provides cumbrous and unnecessarily expensive.  It provides oppressive 
modes of assessment and collection.”  Ultimately, it would create “a system more 
unendurable than the tax itself.”59 
Political leaders were not alone in voicing their fears over the administrative 
machinery that would accompany an income tax; they were simply conveying the 
concerns of their constituents.  Petitions and protest letters poured into congressional 
offices.  Some like those from Pike County, Ohio warned that the new army of tax 
collectors would be prohibitively costly, eating “up at least half of the money that is 
collected.”60  Business interests similarly complained about the “unlimited power” of the 
BIR.61 
B. The War Context 
To be sure, the war context muffled the extent of protests and complaints.  Early 
military victories by the Confederacy and the increasing evidence of wartime profiteering 
convinced many citizens and lawmakers that a vast new bureaucracy of tax collectors 
was a necessary evil if the Union was to survive.  In fact, some political leaders inverted 
the fear of a new “army of officials.”  The powerful chair of the House Ways & Means 
Committee, Thaddeus Stevens, deployed Conkling’s military metaphor against him.  “I 
know that the army of collectors are odious everywhere,” declared Stevens, “but I know, 
also, that they are not quite so dangerous to my constituents . . . as the army of rebels that 
renders this other army necessary; for the one must be raised or the other will be 
triumphant.”62 
Still, there were some lawmakers who insisted that adequate revenues could be 
raised to fight the war without resorting to a vast new federal bureaucracy.  One 
alternative was to leverage the already existing state-level system of tax collection.  Rep. 
Conkling and others contended that “so far as the state machinery can be used for the 
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purpose . . . the expense to the Federal government [will] be saved, and this obnoxious 
provision to the people be avoided.”63 
There was, of course, a great irony to the idea of relying on state governments to 
help collect federal taxes in the midst of the Civil War—an irony that was not lost on 
most lawmakers.  Indeed, for some, the times required a strong showing of federal force.  
After all, one of the central contentions of the war was the battle between state and 
federal authority.  What better way to demonstrate federal supremacy than through the 
creation of a powerful taxing authority.  Congress, declared Virginia Unionist Charles 
Horace, “should make the people feel the arm of the national Government, and know that 
we are in earnest in this manner.”64 
It was against this political backdrop that Congress instituted not only an army of 
tax collectors but also an early form of withholding that would help smooth tensions.  
Borrowing from the British, American lawmakers understood that they needed to assuage 
taxpayer concerns.  Like their British counterparts, US policymakers were operating 
during a wartime emergency with a great deal of uncertainty.  Just as English leaders 
exploited past practices of tax collection, American leaders turned to the British model 
for guidance. Facing a similar set of complaints and protests, American used their 
inchoate form of withholding to address administrative challenges.  “The inclusion of 
withholding techniques in the 1862 legislation was an important innovation in American 
taxation,” historian Joseph Thorndike has aptly noted.  “It reflected an understanding 
among lawmakers of the inherent difficulty of collecting taxes on income.”65  The new 
American system of “stoppage at the source” did not completely eliminate the inherent 
difficulties, but it did provide future lawmakers with a model worth replicating. 
C. The Supreme Court’s Support for Withholding 
Before the Civil War income tax and system of withholding could become a 
model for subsequent policymakers, it had to first withstand a constitutional challenge.  
Well after the war had ended and as the wartime income tax was about to expire, 
taxpayers challenged the withholding provisions of the income tax.66  Section 122(d) of 
the 1864 Revenue Act, as amended by the 1866 Act, required corporations to “deduct and 
withhold from all payments on account of any interest or coupon, and dividends, due and 
payable . . . the tax of 5 per centum.”67  This was the language similar to that used in the 
1862 law which first adopted withholding. 
In this case, the party challenging the provision was the city of Baltimore.  In 
1854, the Maryland legislature approved Baltimore’s issuance of bonds, the proceeds of 
which were subsequently lent to the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company.  As a result of 
these transactions, the railroad became a debtor, and the city of Baltimore was one if its 
creditors.  After the Civil War income taxes were enacted, the U.S. government claimed 
that the railroad company, under Section 122(d), was obligated to withhold and remit to 
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the U.S. Treasury a 5% tax on interest paid to its creditors, including the city of 
Baltimore.68 
The railroad refused, contending that because its creditor (Baltimore) was a 
municipality not subject to taxation by Congress, it was not obligated to withhold and 
remit taxes on behalf of the municipality.  The Court acknowledged that the purpose of 
Section 122(d) was to use railroad companies and other corporations as remittance 
vehicles, with the goal of taxing the ultimate creditor/taxpayer.  “This is a clear, distinct, 
unqualified adjudication, by the unanimous judgment of this court, that the tax imposed 
by the 122(d) section is a tax imposed upon the creditor or stockholder therein named; 
that the tax is not upon the corporation,” wrote the Court, “and that the corporation is 
made use of as a convenient and effective instrument for collecting the same.” 69  
Ultimately, the Court agreed that because the final taxpayer/creditor was a municipality, 
Section 122(d) could not be enforced against the railroad company. 
Yet, in finding for the city, the Court also affirmed the process of income tax 
withholding.  The Court noted that if a private individual made the city of Baltimore its 
agent and trustee to receive interest payments from the railroad, such interest income 
would be subject to income tax withholding because the city would not be receiving 
municipal revenues, but would rather be assuming the position of a private trustee.  In 
such a hypothetical case, the receipt of non-public revenues “would be subject to 
taxation.”70  In the end, the Court focused mainly on the economic substance of the 
transaction—correctly so.  But in the process it approved and implicitly upheld the law’s 
use of withholding.  As we shall see, this tacit approval would soon become a valuable 
tool for income tax supporters. 
IV. THE 1913 INCOME TAX AND THE BEGINNINGS OF U.S. “STOPPAGE AT 
THE SOURCE” 
Between 1872 and 1894, there was no federal income tax.  The Civil War levy 
had expired by 1872.  It was initially intended as a temporary wartime measure, and thus 
when Civil War debt levels receded, Congress allowed the measure to expire without 
renewal.71  There were, however, numerous attempts to revive the income tax in the last 
decades of the nineteenth century.  As the fortunes of America’s leading industrialists 
began to swell, concerns about the growing concentration of wealth and income and the 
massive inequalities of the first Gilded Age began to press upon policy agendas.  In 
response, the populist movement made several attempts to attack inequality through 
numerous devices, including using progressive taxation.72  It was not until 1894 that 
income tax advocates were able to prevail with the first peacetime national income tax.  
Their victory, however, was short-lived, as the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the 1894 
income tax in the following year.73 
For our purposes, the 1894 income tax is significant because it attempted to 
continue the tradition of using a limited form of withholding.  Although the tax was never 
enforced because of the Supreme Court’s invalidation of the law, the 1894 Revenue Act 
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did contain a provision requiring the federal government to withhold income taxes on 
salaries over $4,000.74  Because there was only a flat rate of 2% levied on all income, the 
notion of collecting government employee income through withholding was relatively 
straightforward.  The law did not contain a similar provision, as its Civil War predecessor 
had, to withhold taxes on interest or dividend income. 
The 1894 income tax did, however, respond to some of the critiques leveled 
against the Civil War income tax and its “inquisitorial” collection system.  Instead of 
requiring railroads and other transportation companies to withhold income taxes on 
dividends and interest, the 1894 law developed the innovation of requiring a system of 
third-party information reporting.  Under the invalidated law, business corporations were 
required to report to the BIR the name, address, and salary of each employee who was 
paid more than the statutory exemption level of $4,000.75  The initial House version of 
the 1894 law mirrored the Civil War income tax collection system,76 but the final version 
of the law demonstrated that lawmakers were learning from the past, as they attempted to 
create more of a hybrid system of tax collection.  As we shall see, the 1894 law’s 
innovative mix of using withholding for government employees and information 
reporting for private companies would soon be a model for future collection mechanisms. 
A. The 1913 Comprehensive System of Collection 
The Supreme Court’s invalidation of the 1894 income tax put a halt on the 
progressive income tax movement.  But it was hardly the last word.  Over the next 
decade, as the United States began building an international empire, especially after the 
Spanish-American War, the calls for a more robust national tax system became more 
strident.  In 1909, a movement for a constitutional amendment to overturn the Pollock 
decision began to take shape.77  Within four years, two-thirds of the states had ratified the 
new constitutional amendment, which granted the federal government the power to tax 
incomes without apportionment. 
President Woodrow Wilson and his congressional allies wasted no time in 
leveraging the popular support for the Sixteenth Amendment and the income tax.  In 
1913, the same year the amendment was ratified, the federal government adopted the first 
permanent, peacetime income tax.78  Like its Civil War predecessor, the 1913 income tax 
had graduated rates and contained a “stoppage at the source” provision of withholding.  
Under the new law, all individual incomes above the exemption level of $3,000 were 
taxed at a “normal” rate of 1%, and incomes above that level were taxed at progressive 
“surtax” rates, ranging from an additional 1% on income above $20,000 to 6% on 
incomes above $500,000.79  With its high exemption level, the new income tax reached 
only about 2% of American households.80  It was clearly a “class tax” aimed at the 
wealthy.  Buoyed by the wide-spread and popular support for the Sixteenth Amendment, 
lawmakers enacted a new income tax that was much more progressive than the Civil War 
income tax. 
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A similar sense of optimism also informed Congress’s creation of a more 
comprehensive withholding system.  The new law required any person or organization 
making payments of more than $3,000 in salary, interest, or other fixed income to 
withhold and remit tax payments on behalf of the individual taxpayer.81  Unlike the more 
narrowly-tailored Civil War income tax system, the 1913 version was an ambitious 
attempt to capture nearly all of the “normal” tax through the process of withholding.  
Whereas the Civil War system was limited to government salaries and interest and 
dividends from transportation companies, the 1913 regime was much more 
comprehensive.  As one historian has noted, the goal was “to secure the maximum 
revenue and to prevent evasion by the dishonest taxpayer.”82 
In the process of drafting the new law, congressional leaders fully acknowledged 
that they were borrowing from past U.S. experiences and building upon the British model 
of withholding.  In this sense, even the failure of the 1894 law provided lawmakers and 
Treasury officials with a useful model worth examining.  At the same time, influential 
legislators were also highlighting the unique character of the American economy at the 
time.  Alabama Congressman Oscar Underwood, one of the primary sponsors of the 1913 
law and an early advocate of withholding, pointed to the work of academic experts to 
show that there was ample comparative evidence that “stoppage at the source” could be 
especially effective in the United States.  Underwood explained that the accelerating rise 
of American corporate capitalism had made “stoppage at the source” particularly 
appealing: 
In the United States the arguments in favor of this method are far 
stronger than in Europe, because of the peculiar conditions of American 
life.  In the first place, nowhere is corporate activity so developed and in 
no country of the world does the ordinary business of the community 
assume to so overwhelming an extent the corporate form.  Not only is a 
large part of the intangible wealth of individuals composed of corporate 
securities, but a very appreciable part of business profits consists of 
corporate profits.83 
Accordingly, Underwood predicted that withholding would be particularly 
effective in the United States.  “The arguments that speak in favor of a stoppage at the 
source income tax abroad hence apply with redoubled force here,” concluded 
Underwood.84 
One reason for Underwood’s confidence was his view that withholding could 
facilitate the collection process.  “The stoppage at the source scheme lessens to an 
enormous extent the strain on the administration; it works, so far as it is applicable, 
almost automatically; and where enforced it secures to the last penny the income that is 
rightfully due,” noted Underwood.85  Since the Civil War income tax and its narrow and 
limited version of withholding seemed to be successful, lawmakers appeared willing in 
1913 to push the envelope of taxpayer tolerance by using a much more comprehensive 
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withholding system.  This did not mean, of course, that taxpayers were happy about the 
new law and its comprehensive system of taxation. 
B. Echoes of Resistance 
In fact, there was a great deal of resistance to the 1913 income tax, 
notwithstanding the success of the Sixteenth Amendment.  Whereas income tax 
supporters hailed the new measure as an example of the United States joining other 
civilized, democratic nations, opponents chided that the tax was “un-American.”  New 
York Senator David B. Hill, a longtime opponent of the income tax, warned against the 
“European professors” who were promoting a “new political economy for universal 
application.”  Hill was not modest in his critique.  “From the midst of their armed camps 
between the Danube and the Rhine, the professors with their books, the Socialists with 
their schemes, the archaists with their bombs,” he declared, “all are instructing the people 
of the United States in the organization of society, the doctrines of democracy, and the 
principles of taxation.”86 
Meanwhile, other income tax opponents criticized the collection system, reviving 
the Civil War claims about an inquisitorial “army of officials.” 87   Philadelphia 
Representative Robert Adams Jr. warned that the process of withholding and self-
assessment would “corrupt” the people, and bring an unwanted army of “spies” and 
“informants.” 88   Other lawmakers claimed the income tax and the comprehensive 
withholding system would put “a premium upon dishonesty and evasion of the law.”89 
To guard against any potential dishonesty and evasion, the 1913 law empowered 
the U.S. Treasury Department to develop the necessary bureaucratic details and 
machinery to enforce the new system of withholding.  Reflecting back on the Civil War 
experience, Wilson’s Treasury Secretary William McAdoo was well aware of the need to 
create a robust tax enforcement system.90  Unlike the Civil War emergency, the 1913 
income tax was adopted at a time of relative calm.  In puzzling over the new 
administrative machinery, policymakers in the Treasury could think carefully about how 
to improve upon past experiences with withholding. 
One attempted improvement was to combine information reporting with 
withholding.  Less than a month after the enactment of the 1913 law, the Treasury 
Department issued two detailed regulations outlining the specific requirements of the new 
withholding system.91  These regulations provided precise guidance on which financial 
institutions in the chain of fiduciary agents had the legal duty to collect and remit taxes.  
They also emphasized the importance of ascertaining accurate tax information and using 
institutions like large-scale, industrial corporations as deputized tax-collecting agents.92  
In short, the Treasury Department appeared to agree with Underwood’s theory that the 
development of corporate capitalism in the United States provided a unique opportunity 
for tax authorities. 
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C. The Legal Significance of Withholding 
The significance of these administrative reforms did not escape the notice of 
legal experts.  Garrard Glenn, a New York commercial lawyer and occasional Columbia 
Law School Lecturer, identified “collection at the source” as “the new law’s most salient, 
if not its most popular feature.”  What caught Glenn’s attention was how the new 
regulations authorized a form of private, third-party reporting and remittance that 
appeared revolutionary.  In the case of interest payments, for instance, the regulations 
required debtor corporations and financial institutions to remit withheld taxes along with 
certificates of ownership identifying the taxpayer/creditor.  Similar rules were established 
for other forms of fixed income payments.  “Thus in every case of deduction at the 
source,” wrote Glenn, “the Government ends by not only getting the tax, but by knowing 
whom it is taxing.”93  Citing to the Supreme Court case upholding the Civil War use of 
withholding,94 Glenn explained that the courts had long upheld the use of a business 
corporation as “an agent of the Government for the collection of the tax.”  The new 
regulations, however, went further.  They “laid upon this citizen turned tax gatherer the 
additional duty of collecting from the creditor a statement identifying himself as such.”95 
The gathering and disclosure of this type of personal information was precisely 
what income tax detractors feared when they claimed that the new law would be 
inquisitorial.  With the new law and regulations, some of the country’s leading business 
corporations had become deputized tax collectors.  Yet, rather than retreat from this 
criticism, Glenn frankly acknowledged that an income tax inherently required such 
intrusions.  “We might as well face the fact,” Glenn conceded, “that the Government 
cannot go very far with taxation of incomes without being forced to adopt an inquisitorial 
system for discovering objects of taxation.”96  What was far more important for Glenn 
and state-builders in the Treasury Department, who were trying to create a well-
functioning tax system, was the desire to provide the income tax with greater social 
legitimacy and credibility. 
Indeed, if there is one thing that government officials learned over time, it was 
that administrative reforms had to be supported and accepted by the people.  The use of 
withholding complemented by information reporting was one way of developing that 
acceptance and legitimacy.  The process of collecting taxpayer information not only 
facilitated greater social control and surveillance by making national taxpayers more 
visible or legible to state actors, 97  it also assured other Americans that the federal 
government was serious about enforcing a tax aimed primarily at the country’s wealthiest 
citizens.  Because the 1913 income tax was a class tax created by political elites aimed at 
economic elites, the withholding and information gathering aspects of the new law may 
have bolstered faith and confidence in the new fiscal system.  By securing the tax at the 
source and verifying the accurate taxpayer, the new law demonstrated that the income tax 
was much more than mere political rhetoric.  If quotidian workers and farmers, who paid 
their share of taxes to the national government through excise taxes and import duties, 
could be assured that national tax authorities were monitoring and collecting income 
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taxes from the wealthier classes, these ordinary working-class Americans were more 
likely to support the new tax system.98 
V. THE DOMINANCE OF INFORMATION REPORTING 
While the new system of withholding and reporting may have provided greater 
political credence and social credibility, the ultimate effectiveness of the collection 
mechanisms was soon called into question.  In fact, within three years, the process of 
income tax withholding was eliminated in favor of a simpler method of third-party 
reporting, which was referred to as “information at source.”99  This subtle yet significant 
shift occurred for at least two reasons.  First, there was growing political and social 
pressure from business organizations that had been compelled to become deputized tax 
collectors.  Second, government administrators came to recognize that they needed to 
solve the problem of social resistance by gradually acclimating taxpayers to the new levy 
and its exacting system of collection, while at the same time building up their 
administrative capacity.  The income tax, simply put, was still an innovation for many 
taxpayers and withholding agents—an innovation that required a certain amount of social 
learning and popular acceptance. 
A. Growing Opposition to Withholding 
Indeed, even before the 1913 law was enacted, some lawmakers were warning 
that the novelty of the income tax warranted greater patience.  “Like any new tax law,” 
Tennessee Congressman Cordell Hull, one of the chief architects of the income tax noted, 
“it will be necessary for the people to become acquainted with the proposed law and for it 
to become adjusted to the country before extending its classifications, abatements, 
deductions, exemptions and so forth.”100  To be sure, state-level income taxes had been in 
existence for some time, including a modern version adopted in Wisconsin in 1911 
complete with information reporting.  Still, the complexities of the collection process 
were still a novelty for the nation as a whole.  
In this sense, contemporaries like Congressman Underwood and Garrard Glenn 
may have been overly optimistic about the social acceptance of withholding and its 
ability to generate revenue.  Given the paucity of empirical data from the time period, it is 
difficult to determine precisely how effective the new system of withholding actually 
was.  Initially, some lawmakers estimated that the new collection system would yield 
two-thirds of income tax revenue. 101   Economic experts reflecting back on the tax 
indicated that the withholding system probably raised “less than one-fourth” of total 
income tax revenues.102  Others have suggested that it might have been even less.103 
Although the exact effectiveness of withholding may be uncertain, there was 
little doubt that many tax experts feared that the regulations requiring third-party 
reporting may have been overly onerous, especially given the novelty of the new system.  
“Perhaps no feature of the income tax law,” noted political economist Roy G. Blakey, 
“has caused more unfavorable criticism than the stoppage-at-the-source provision, which 
throws much of the burden of collecting the government’s revenue upon banks, trust 
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companies, corporations, and other agents.” 104   Of course, most corporations and 
financial institutions by this time already had the managerial skills and information to 
comply with withholding and the regulations regarding information reporting, but the 
novelty and intricacies of the process provided an opportunity for many to question the 
use of corporations as withholding agents. 
The New York banker Mortimer Schiff was among those who voiced strong 
opposition to the new collection system.  Schiff conceded that he was no enemy of the 
income tax.  “I am inclined to favor this form of raising revenue for the government,” 
wrote Schiff referring to the new income tax, “if the tax is equitably levied and 
administered.”105  Yet he was deeply ambivalent about the new collection methods.  For 
him, the combination of withholding and information reporting gave “rise to the greatest 
cause of complaint.” 
Part of the reason was the uniqueness of the system for Americans who valued 
their privacy.  Indeed, for Schiff and others, the borrowing of British ideas about tax 
collection was viewed as wholly foreign.  “We are not used to the parental form of many 
European governments and, therefore,” wrote Schiff, “an income tax, with its resultant 
inquisitorial methods and prying into the affairs of individuals is, from its nature, bound 
to cause dissatisfaction, a large part of which is possibly unwarranted.”106 
With this observation, Schiff singled out how the United States was different 
from other countries that adopted an income tax and a system of withholding.  For him, 
America was exceptional.  “This method of collection is an importation from Europe and 
is copied, to a great extent, from the provisions of the English income tax law,” he 
admitted.  “It has, however, apparently been overlooked that in England substantially 
everybody, except the person dependent upon daily wages, is taxed and that practically 
no one in receipt of any other form of income is exempt.”107  He continued that there 
were many other factors that set the United States apart from England and other European 
countries, including the size of the United States, the way it conducted business, and 
especially the way that American banks and corporations distributed interest to their bond 
holders.108 
Ultimately, Schiff was deeply ambivalent about the new collection methods.  On 
the one hand, he believed that the Treasury regulations were gradually becoming more 
rational and routinized, and consequently collections were “considerably simplified.”109  
Yet, on the other hand, he insisted that it was unfair for the government to deputize 
private citizens as tax collectors without any remuneration.  “It does not seem fair that the 
government should force corporations and individuals to bear this expense and do work, 
which probably belongs to the government, without compensation,” he wrote. 110  
According to Schiff’s anecdotal accounts, some railway companies had to double the size 
of their clerical departments to keep up with demands of collection at the source, and they 
did so at their own costs. 
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Schiff concluded his analysis of the income tax with three recommendations.  
First, he called for a lowering of exemptions levels so that more taxpayers could be 
included in the tax system.  Second, he argued that “the law should be so clarified as to 
make it comprehensible to the average person.”  Third, and perhaps most important for 
our purposes, he contended that “the system of collection at the source should be 
abandoned and a system of collection from the recipient substituted, with information at 
the source and severe penalties for false statements.”111 
B. Reforms to Rescue Information Reporting 
It was not only business leaders like Schiff who were weary of withholding.  
Treasury officials seemed to agree.  But rather than abolish the entire collection system, 
they sought to find a middle ground.  By 1916, Treasury Secretary McAdoo and his staff 
began to reconsider the costs and benefits of their dual system of income tax withholding 
and rigorous information reporting.  In his annual report, McAdoo recommended that 
Congress “do away with the withholding of the income tax at the source, and in place 
thereof . . . require information at the source.”112  Although McAdoo did not directly 
address the onerous administrative burden that the new collection system placed on the 
Treasury Department, his comments were interpreted by many as a plea for assistance.  
The existing law, as we’ve seen, required both withholding and reporting, but McAdoo’s 
point was to draw attention to the particular demand of verifying the process of 
withholding. 
Yet, for most Treasury officials, some form of third-party assistance was 
considered absolutely essential.  After three years of experience with the new income tax, 
they realized that if they were to sustain a new and effective tax and collection system, 
they needed to find a way to placate business interests.  Thus, McAdoo and the Treasury 
Department settled on eliminating the direct withholding of income taxes to maintain the 
reporting of tax information.  In framing this reform for lawmakers, the Treasury 
Department stressed both the financial and political benefits.  This new system, McAdoo 
contended, “will mean the collection of a larger amount of revenue and eliminate a great 
deal of criticism which has been directed against the law.”113  Although McAdoo may 
have been overly optimistic about his revenue estimates, his aim was to consolidate some 
remnant of the new collection system rather than have the entire process eliminated. 
Despite the Treasury Department’s recommendations and the growing social 
antagonism towards withholding, Congress did not immediately repeal the provision in 
1916.  In fact, it wasn’t until the United States officially entered World War I the 
following year that the withholding system and the entire income tax regime were 
changed dramatically.114  With the onset of a global war, lawmakers quickly realized that 
they needed to turn to the nascent income tax as a major source of wartime revenue. 
Once the United States officially entered the war in April 1917, the economic 
demands of waging an international war became obvious.  Over the next three years, the 
federal government enacted a series of revenue laws that transformed the modern 
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American income tax.  By the height of the war, the top marginal tax rate on individual 
income had skyrocketed from a pre-war figure of 7% to 77%.  At the same time, 
exemption levels dropped dramatically and nearly 20% of the American labor force was 
paying income taxes.115  Although the United States did not introduce a mass income tax 
at this time, the experience with steeply progressive individual income taxes and 
innovative war profits and excess profits taxes on business paved the way for future 
reforms.  Perhaps most importantly, the 1917 Revenue Act repealed the requirement of 
direct income tax withholding while maintaining a reporting system of “information at 
the source.”116 
The growing business opposition to withholding and the Treasury Department’s 
pre-war ambivalence surely played a part in the abolition of direct withholding.  But an 
equally important factor was the astonishing complexity of the new wartime tax regime.  
The dramatic rise in rates, the enactment of complex and uncertain business taxes, and 
the drop in exemption levels—not to mention the numerous bond drives—all placed 
tremendous administrative stress on the Treasury Department as well as deputized private 
sector tax collectors.  One obvious way to relieve that stress without overly comprising 
revenue was to eliminate withholding while maintaining information reporting. 
For present day commentators, the abolition of withholding in 1917 has been 
interpreted as a sign of the pre-World War II failures of withholding.  “[I]t is the Revenue 
Act of 1917,” writes Anuj Desai, “that so clearly tells us that withholding was not 
entrenched in any sense of that word: an income tax without any withholding was not 
only possible, it had now become law.”117   Desai elides, however, how information 
reporting remained a crucial part of the tax collection system from 1913 throughout 
World War I.  Private, third-party organizations, namely large businesses and financial 
institutions, were still required to provide “information at the source.”  They did so not 
only because the law required it, at least since 1913, but also because they had the 
modern managerial and accounting systems in place to comply with these information 
reporting requirements.118  To focus only on withholding while ignoring information 
reporting misses how these two provisions worked to bolster the burgeoning income tax 
regime. 
Indeed, the income tax and the system of third-party reporting flourished during 
World War I, and their success helped ensure their post-war consolidation.  “Without the 
intervention of the United States in World War I,” historian W. Elliot Brownlee has 
noted, “the development of federal taxation would have proceeded far more 
incrementally.  It most certainly would have relied much more heavily on the taxation of 
consumption.”119  The fundamental rejection of a mass consumption tax, such as a retail 
sales tax, during the war and afterwards demonstrated that while lawmakers and business 
interests may have had their doubts about the income tax and withholding, they were not 
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willing to experiment with an entirely new tax order after the war.  In fact, the income tax 
and third-party reporting would continue at the federal level unabated until the mid-1930s 
when the Great Depression and the enactment of the 1935 Social Security Act provided a 
new opportunity to reconsider the return of withholding. 
C. Social Security and the Return of Withholding 
If the national emergency of World War I provided the context for saving 
information reporting, it was another national crisis that led to the return of a crude form 
of withholding.  The Great Depression, like World War I, was a crisis that dramatically 
altered the fiscal landscape.  The Depression changed the way everyday Americans 
thought about the role of government in the economy and society.  Led by President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, the New Deal order attempted to address the many social 
dislocations brought on by the economic crisis.120 
During most of his first term, President Roosevelt advanced a cautious fiscal 
policy.  Like his predecessor, Herbert Hoover, FDR was initially committed to balanced 
budgets.  But, unlike Hoover, Roosevelt was a supporter of highly progressive income 
taxes that could potentially “soak the rich.”121  While the Roosevelt administration and its 
congressional allies originally attempted to craft a fiscal policy that adhered to the two 
pillars of balanced budgets and soak-the-rich taxation, their enactment of the Social 
Security Act in 1935, with its regressive payroll taxes, seemed to undermine the 
commitment to progressivity. 122  Some historians have interpreted Roosevelt’s turn to 
payroll taxes as evidence that his calls for tax justice were symbolic and hollow.123 
Yet, because Social Security was framed as a form of old-age insurance, where 
tax payments were earmarked for future benefits, Roosevelt and his allies did not see it as 
a regressive component of fiscal policy.  In fact, by earmarking these tax payments as 
insurance premiums, Roosevelt had hoped to secure the long-run durability of Social 
Security.  In this sense, he was driven by both economic and political motives.  “With 
those taxes in there,” he was reported to have stated, “no damn politician can ever scrap 
my social security program.”124  Over the decades, Roosevelt’s vision has become reality. 
Another reason for Social Security’s long-term survival has been its effective use 
of withholding, which many scholars have depicted as “the groundwork for the full-scale 
adoption of withholding enacted during World War II.”125  But, as we’ve seen, Social 
Security was not the federal government’s first use of withholding.  Rather, the 
administrators who supported Social Security and its use of payroll deductions were 
building upon the consistent use of information reporting for income taxes, and returning 
to the pre-1917 use of income tax withholding.  This was perhaps the quintessential 
example of social learning: government administrators relying on past policies and 
practices as a guide for addressing new and pressing problems. 
At its core, Social Security was designed to be a comprehensive and compulsory 
social insurance program funded by both employer and employee contributions.  
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According to the statute, the tax on employees was to “be collected by the employer of 
the taxpayer, by deducting the amount of the tax from the wages as and when paid.”  In 
sum, the law requires employers both to pay their portion of the contribution and 
withhold and remit the employee’s contribution at its source.126 
Implementing Social Security was a colossal administrative task.  The Bureau of 
Internal Revenue had to assist roughly 3.5 million employers who had to make 
contributions on behalf of more than 30 million employees.  One of the earliest 
administrators referred to the accounting challenges as “the largest bookkeeping job in 
the world.”127  Yet, as Treasury officials noted, employers were already collecting and 
remitting information about high-income taxpayers.  Extending that reporting 
requirement to a broader swath of workers was simply an elaboration of an existing 
system.  As Frank Mires of the Treasury Department explained, “little more would be 
required of the employer than he already does.”128  Thus, the Social Security System’s 
adoption of withholding was less of an innovation than it was an elaboration of existing 
practices and a return to an earlier tax collection regime.129 
VI. CONCLUSION 
While the adoption of Social Security and its system of withholding was certainly 
a key moment in the expansion and incremental process of administrative reform, a 
second salient moment occurred during World War II.  For that was when the 
establishment of a mass income tax facilitated the full-fledged return of income tax 
withholding.  Other scholars have already adequately explained the importance of the 
Victory Tax of 1942, the Current Tax Payment Act of 1943, and the Ruml Plan that 
helped expedite the transition to a withholding regime of tax collection.130   What is 
important for our purpose is to see how the mid-1940s was part of a larger and broader 
trajectory of tax administrative reform.  World War II, in this sense, was not solely a 
watershed moment in tax administrative reform; it provided, instead, an important 
emergency context for the culmination of administrative reforms that had begun as early 
as the Civil War. 
The history of income tax withholding and information reporting from the Civil 
War to World War II thus provides an illustration of the usefulness and limits of theories 
about social learning and policy change.  First, this history shows the primacy of ideas for 
institutional reform, just as social learning advocates would suggest.  Like all institutions, 
withholding and information reporting did not just randomly appear on the American 
administrative stage.  Rather, the adoption of this tax collection institution occurred 
through a historical process, whereby influential individuals promoted particular ideas 
and concepts at specific moments, with the use of unique resources and power. 
Second, the incremental development of withholding and information reporting 
did not occur simply because of the bureaucratic autonomy of state actors, as the theory 
of social learning would suggest.  Treasury officials, to be sure, played a key role in this 
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historical process, but while these state actors were puzzling over solutions, powerful 
private political and social actors were also exercising their authority over the shape of 
future reforms.  Administrative reforms were thus produced by a combination of semi-
autonomous public figures responding to social and political pressures. 
Finally, withholding and information reporting arrived, above all else, through a 
gradual process of evolution.  Although there were salient events and key historical 
contexts—frequently national emergencies—that acted as catalysts or accelerants, the 
deep-seated causes of administrative reform were more subaltern and less sudden.  In 
fact, our current process of tax collection went through several periods of episodic 
reform, from the original implementation of a crude and limited form of withholding 
during the Civil War to the comprehensive use of tax collection in 1913 to abolition of 
withholding during WWI, and then finally to the return of withholding and information 
reporting during the 1930s and ‘40s. 
What can this historical story of incremental administrative reform teach us about 
other types of policy changes?  Can this historically specific tale be generalized across 
other policy arenas?  Perhaps not.  But if there is a lesson to be drawn, it is that current 
failures may turn out to provide the foundation for future success.  The elimination of 
withholding in 1917, for example, may have seemed like a step back for some tax 
administrators and fiscal reformers, but ultimately, this “failure” permitted the 
maintenance of information reporting, which became a crucial foundation for future tax 
administrative reforms.  If scholars of American healthcare are correct, the recent success 
of healthcare reforms may be the result of a similarly long process of episodic attempts at 
political change.131  There may be an art to losing that allows current setbacks to tee up or 
prompt future reforms. 
In the end, this historical narrative about the origins and early development of 
U.S. income tax withholding and third party reporting is not simply an antiquarian tale 
about forgotten moments in American legal and administrative history.  Rather, this story 
is meant to provide a usable past. It is intended to shed some light, albeit cautiously, on 
the general conditions and processes that can facilitate possible bureaucratic reform.  
Thus, for a law review symposium on “Reforming the IRS,” this historical tale is more 
than mere prologue; it is meant to provide a broader perspective on the seminal events, 
key actors, and structural processes that have shaped past attempts at institutional change.  
Ultimately, the goal of this history is to provide a better understanding of current 
administrative practices and the promise of future reforms. 
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